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Uniformity In State Inheritance Laws: How UPC
Article II Has Fared In Nine Enactments
Richard V. Wellman*
James W. Gordon**

The Uniform Probate Code was drafted to facilitate mod
ernization, simplification, and uniformity of state inheritance
laws. Since its approval by the National Conference of Commis
sioners on Uniform State Laws and by the American Bar Asso
ciation in August 1969, the Code has been enacted in various
forms by 11 states. In this article, Messrs. Wellman and Gordon
analyze significant deviations from the recommended version of
article II in the first nine enactments of the UPC. The authors
argue that all but exceptionally meritorious changes in enacted
versions of the UPC should give way to the goal of state uniform
ity in inheritance laws, and find the majority of the changes to
be unjustifiable. In evaluating the merits of the changes, the
authors consider UPC policies behind individual sections of the
Code as well as state reasons for deviations.

Article II of the Uniform Probate Code deals with the sub
stantive rules of intestate succession, family protection, and
wills. 1 This article identifies and analyzes the substantial devia
* Robert Cotton Alston Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law; A.B.,
J.D., University of Michigan; Chief Reporter, Uniform Probate Code, 1967-1970; Educa
tional Director, Joint Editorial Board for the Uniform Probate Code, 1972.
** A.B., University of Louisville; J.D., University of Kentucky; Member, Kentucky
Bar; Research Associate, Joint Editorial Board for the Uniform Probate Code, Summer
1975.
The authors gratefully acknowledge the research assistance of Gerald W. Pierce of the
third year class, University of Georgia School of Law.
1. UNIFORM PRoBATE ConE [hereinafter cited as UPC].
Article II of the Code contains nine parts: Intestate Succession, Elective Share of
Surviving Spouse, Spouse and Children Unprovided For in Wills, Exempt Property and
Allowances, Wills, Rules of Construction, Contractual Arrangements Relating to Death,
General Provisions, and Custody and Deposit of Wills. This article does not examine state
adaptations of Part 2 of art. IT dealing with the elective share of the surviving spouse since
deviations from this part of the Code were anticipated, if not encouraged. In fact, the
Code's recommendations on this aspect of inheritance law appear to have stimulated am
increase in the variety of extant and proposed solutions to problems respecting disinheri
tance of spouses, demonstrating that it will be many more years before anything resem
bling a dominant or uniform pattern of American law can be expected to emerge. Even
Idaho and Arizona, the first two community property states to accept the Code, followed
somewhat different courses in relation to the elective share problem.
Alterations in § 2-801 dealing with the doctrine of renunciation also receive no treat
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tions from the provisions of article II that have occurred in the
first nine UPC enactments: Alaska, 2 Arizona, 3 Colorado, 4 ldaho, 5
Montana, 6 Nebraska/ North Dakota, 8 South Dakota, 9 and Utah. 10
Part I of the article discusses general policies underlying UPC
article IT. Part IT treats the various state adaptations by code
section, considering principles behind the individual sections and
analyzing deviations from the UPC provisions that were not
adopted as recommended. 11
ment in this article. This section, as approved in the 1969 draft of the UPC, represented
a modification of recommendations made by a study and drafting committee of the Ameri
can Bar Association's Real Property, Probate and Trust Law Section. See Special Comm.
on Disclaimer Legislation, Disclaimer of Testamentary and Nontestamentary Disposi
tions-Suggestions for a Model Act, 3 REAL PROP. PRos. & TRUST J. 131 (1968). This ABA
study later formed the basis of a separate drafting effort by the National Conference. of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws which resulted, in 1973, in new proposals for
uniform state laws regarding renunciation of transfers and successions. UNIFORM Dis
CLAIMER OF TRANSFERS BY WILL, INTESTACY OR APPOINTMENT ACT; UNIFORM DISCLAIMER OF
TRANSFERS UNDER NONTESTAMENTARY INSTRUMENTS ACT; UNIFORM DISCLAIMER OF PROPERTY
INTERESTS ACT [in 1973 HANDBOOK OF THE NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIFORM
STATE LAws 204, 212, 217]. Recently, the groups that have continued to be concerned with
the shape and fate of the Uniform Probate Code adapted UPC § 2-801, a section proposed
by the National Conference dealing with renunciation, to the 1973 uniform law.
AMENDMENTS TO THE UNIFORM PROBATE CoDE (in 1975 NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON
UNIFORM STATE LAws]. These amendments appear in the 1975 edition of the UPC, re
cently published by West Publishing Company. In the meantime, several states, including
those enacting the Uniform Probate Code, have enacted legislation reflecting various
stages of these continuing national drafting efforts. The resulting statutory variants merit
comparison, but the topic is essentially unrelated to the theme of deviations from the
UPC.
Finally, this article does not consider the matters covered in§ 2-803, dealing with the
effect of homicide on inheritance. The National Conference of Commissioners placed this
section in brackets to indicate they did not attach to it the usual recommendation for
uniform enactment. The Com"inissioners expected the deviations that have occurred in all
but two enactments of this section.
2. ALASKA STAT. § 13 (1972).
3. ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14 (Spec. Pamphlet 1974).
4. CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15-10 to -17 (1973).
5. IDAHO ConE tit. 15 (Supp. 1975).
6. MoNT. REv. ConEs ANN. § 91A (Spec. Uniform Prob. Code Pamphlet 1975).
7. NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 30-2201 to -2902 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
8. N.D. CENT. ConE§ 30.1 (Spec. Uniform Prob. Code Supp. 1975).
9. S.D. UNIFORM PROB. ConE §§ 1-101 et seq. (1975). On February 27, 1976, however,
the South Dakota legislature voted in favor of HB 712 to repeal this statute, effective later
this year. Despite the repeal of the statute, a discussion of its provisions in this article is
merited in view of the overall purpose of the article, which is to weigh reasons for various
state changes against the UPC policies behind recommended Code provisions.
10. UTAH ConE ANN. § 75 (Spec. Supp. 1975).
11. Many of the sections in art. II have been adopted in all of the UPC states studied
either without modification or with such minor change that the sense of the Code language
is preserved. In none of the states were more than a handful of major changes made.
Presumably, the unaltered and insignificantly altered sections represent rules of inheri
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UPC POLICY GOALS

A.

In General

Analysis of state adaptations of the UPC requires considera
tion of the policy goals the UPC drafters sought to implement.
Those goals include the following: (1) to provide, by law, an ac
ceptable estate plan for those of modest means who, through
reliance or default, leave their estates to be disposed of in accord
ance with laws governing intestacies; 12 (2) to bring probate law
into the 20th century by making it responsive to modern atti
tudes;13 (3) to enable the will to become a more popular instru
ment for disposition of wealth-at death; 14 ( 4) to facilitate inter
vivos and post mortem estate planning by providing clear guide
lines for draftsmen and maximum flexibility for estate planners; 15
(5) to provide substantive rules that facilitate efficient estate
administration; 16 and (6) to encourage uniformity of law in an
area where a substantial segment of our population is inconven
ienced by various parochial rules that serve no significant local
purpose. 17
Attainment of the first goal, improvement of the law's estate
plan, should benefit both the average estate owner and the profes
sional estate planner. The average estate owner should benefit
from Code rules governing intestacy and related procedures that
are designed to more accurately reflect the desires of most per
sons. Estate planners should benefit from the decreased necessity
of drawing wills for and administering small estates, where ade
quate compensation is more the exception than the rule. They
also may benefit from new, more precise, inheritance concepts
which can be incorporated into custom plans.
The second goal, modernizing inheritance rules, reflects the
state of present probate law in the United States that perpetuates
many historical rules that long ago ceased to make sense. Despite
tance that lend themselves more readily to uniform acceptance than those rules expressed
in the altered sections.
12. UPC art. TI, pt. 1, General Comment.
13. /d.
14. /d. art. II, pt. 5, General Comment.
15. See, e.g., Moore, Estate Planning Opportunities Which May Be Possible Under
the Uniform Probate Code, 1 EsTATE PLANNING 83 (1974); Wellman, Some Effects of the
Uniform Probate Code on Estate Planning, 4 INST. EsTATE PLANNING ch. 70-19 (1970).
16. The procedure provided in § 2-404 for establishing and satisfying the family
allowance and the elimination of remote relatives as heirs in § 2-103 provide an illustra
tion.
17. See notes 30-36 and accompanying text infra.
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the efficacy of most law, community respect for legal rules suffers
when, as is true of many points of inheritance law, today's case
results are explainable only by reference to notions that clash
with current mores. To help alleviate this anomaly, the Code
eliminates discrimination in inheritance laws against "half
bloods," illegitimates, aliens, and females. 18 The Code also rede
fines the status of adopted children to reflect modern perceptions
of the family, 19 abolishes the difference for probate purposes be
tween realty and personalty, 20 and eliminates the so-called
"laughing heir" by limiting succession to those relatives de
scended from a grandparent of the decedent. 21
The third goal, making the will a more popular tool for dispo
sition of wealth at death, is attractive to all who oppose the drift
to more complexity in simple matters. Its achievement will ena
ble the wishes of more decedents to be realized. To further this
goal, the Code minimizes the formalities required for execution
of a will, 22 validates holographs, 23 eliminates penalties on benefi
ciary witnesses, 24 and allows extrinsic writings to be incorporated
into wills by reference or to be utilized without incorporation to
pass certain tangible personal property. 25 Moreover, the UPC low
ers the age of competency to make a will to 1826 and gives a
testator broader ability to choose the law that will govern the
provisions of his will. 27 Most importantly, it offers executors and
their counselors approximately the same flexibility and freedom
from judicial supervision of estates as that presently available to
trustees under inter vivos instruments. 28
Facilitation of inter vivos and post mortem estate planning,
the fourth goal, is accomplished principally by provisions sprin
kled throughout the Code that are designed to free fiduciary ad
ministration of trusts and estates from unnecessary court control.
Article II's chief contributions to estate planners are found in its
provisions that liberate the will from needless formalities and
18. UPC §§ 2-107, -109, -112. The Code is consistently impartial with regard to sex.
19. ld. §§ 2-109, -611.
20. Id. §§ 1-201(11) & (33), 2-101, 3-101.
21. Id. § 2-103.
22. Id. § 2-502.
23. Id. § 2-503.
24. Id. § 2-505.
25. Id. §§ 2-510, -513. The Code also gives effect to events of independent signifi
cance. Id. § 2-512.
26. ld. § 2-501.
27. Id. §§ 2-506, -602.
28. See id. art. Ill, General Comment.
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improve renunciation as a means of post mortem estate plan
ning.29
Article II contributes to the fifth goal, simplifying estate
administration, principally by its family protection provisions
that are designed to function without the necessity of court orders
for support of dependents.
The final goal, uniformity of state laws, has been somewhat
controversial. The debate over this goal is sufficiently intense to
justify an extended analysis.
B.

The Goal of Uniformity

The pros and cons regarding uniformity can be reduced to a
conflict between the interests of probate specialists and the inter
ests of estate owners. Legally trained people who tend to equate
legal tradition with common sense and who have a vested interest
in maintaining complexity and diversity in the law are likely to
view uniformity of inheritance law as unnecessary, unwise, and
politically unattainable. 30 On the other hand, lay persons are apt
to view inheritance laws as unnecessarily complex and conclude
that elimination of differences between state rules of inheritance
is an obvious and desirable way of simplifying matters. 31 The
problems inherent in the present diversity of inheritance laws are
particularly burdensome to elderly persons who are under the
most immediate pressure to plan their estates around the varia
tions of rules in the states with which they have, or may later
have, contacts. 32
Despite the furor, however, states are in basic agreement
that, subject only to the rights of creditors and taxing authorities,
owners may dispose of their estates by will as they see fit. The
points where state laws restrict freedom of testation are relatively
few and unimportant; 33 the bulk of our diverse probate rules exist
29. See authorities cited note 15 supra. Provisions in arts. Ill, V, VI, and Vll also aid
in facilitating inter vivos and post mortem estate planning.
30. See generally Zartman, An Illinois Critique of the Uniform Probate Code, 1970
u. ILL. L.F. 413.
31. See, e.g., Settling An Estate, CHANGING TIMES, THE KIPLINGER MAGAZINE, Nov.
1972, at 6.
32. The National Retired Teachers Association and the American Association of
Retired Persons (NRTA-AARP) have endorsed the Code since 1972. Brickfield, AARP
Comes to Your Legislature, MoDERN MATURITY, April-May 1974, at 26.
33. These include the protection of spouses in one another's estate, protection of
children against parental disinheritance, the proper categorization of unworthy heirs, the
propriety of legal t'estraints on gifts by will to aliens and charities, and differences regard
ing the capacity of minors and felons to make wills. See G. PALMER, TRusTs AND SuccESSION
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merely to support and protect testamentary intention, including,
for purposes of this discussion, the presumed intentions of intes
tates that provide the principal rationale for statutes covering
descent and distribution. Since any general state interest in sup
porting owners' intentions would be best served by keeping the
rules that guide owners as clear and as simple as possible, it
would seem that a state would serve its own interests best by
aligning with widely recognized national standards on all rules
that do not reflect conceded, parochial restraints on testamentary
freedom. For example, it should not matter, as a point of state
policy, what words in a will are sufficient to disinherit afterbom
children, so long as the principle of testator control is conceded.
Therefore, for the sake of clarity and simplicity, a state should
align its rule on this point to nationally recommended formulae
that are most likely to be known and heeded. Similarly, it should
not matter to a particular state whether an intestate's descen
dants take per stirpes or per capita; the point is to have a clear
rule that is likely to be widely understood. So viewed, the public
interest in unifying and thus simplifying inheritance matters for
our mobile population should predominate over any parochial
view about how testamentary intention may be served best. 34
A serious move toward uniformity of inheritance rules also
provides· the benefit of creating an opportunity to review old poli
cies that have remained unquestioned, possibly for generations.
Some points of policy difference between the states regarding
restrictions on testamentary freedom should disappear as legisla
tors take a fresh look at such questions as whether it makes sense
to restrain charitable testamentary gifts, 35 whether to continue
189-213 (2d ed. 1968); T. ATKINSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF WILLS 100-158 (2d ed. 1953)
[hereinafter cited as ATKINSON].
34. As suggested in note 33 supra, there are substantive points on which states differ,
and will continue to differ, even with the UPC in effect. However, it does not follow from
the concession that states may continue to differ in their laws regarding the protection of
spouses and children from disinheritance and regarding devises to aliens, charities, and
certain others that all other rules of inheritance must likewise remain diverse. As indicated
earlier, no problems touching the areas of substantive policy difference arise in the vast
majority of estates. SeeM. SusSMAN, J. CATES & D. SMITH, THE FAMILY AND INHERITANCE
(1970) [hereinafter cited as SussMAN]. Further, the most familiar form of legal protection
against prohibited disinheritance of spouses and children is structured so that the inter
ests to be protected, like the spouse's interest in community property, are simply placed
beyond the reach of the decedent's will. ATKINSON 123. Even variations among states
concerning the amount of a decedent's estate. that will be protected for the spouse and
children from creditors' claims do not detract from the desirability of uniform rules for
whatever property remains for distribution.
35. Cf. In re Cavill's Estate, 329 A.2d 503 (Pa. 1974) (holding invalid Pennsylvania's

357]

UNIFORMITY IN STATE INHERITANCE LAWS

363

ancient disabilities regarding inheritances of aliens and felons,
and whether to maintain probate exemption levels established
generations ago.
A possible objection to achieving uniformity in any area of
the law is that local reliance on established rules makes a major
revision of existing law untenable. However, no pattern of com
munity reliance or individual expectation, other than the inter
ests of the professionals in keeping the rules parochial, can be
pointed to that would justify retention of existing, variant inheri
tance laws. There are data indicating that most decedents' es
tates are controlled by wills" that reject statutory rules. 36 This
suggests the antithesis of reliance on existing rules and demon
strates that current statutory rules do not conform to most peo
ple's desires concerning distribution of their estates. Also, the
familiar concept that the law does not protect expectancies is
completely congenial to the idea that legislation may change an
cient rules of inheritance to align with national norms. In any
event, since such unifying legislation would only apply to estates
of persons dying after it becomes effective, rights existing under
former rules would not be disrupted.
In short, it seems clear that the general public, as opposed
to governmental and legal specialists who have vested interests
in existing inheritance laws, would benefit significantly from sim
plified and uniform inheritance rules. This article, therefore, will
focus on whether enacted deviations from article II can be justi
fied in light of the public policy favoring uniformity and simplic
ity over a state legislature's interest in adopting deviant rules.

II.

ARTICLE

II

SECTIONS AND STATE CHANGES

With a single minor exception, none of the enacted changes
in UPC article II warrant deviation from the goal of uniformity.
Their appearance in enactments that otherwise embrace the goal
of interstate uniformity may be attributed to the failure of enact
ing legislatures to understand some UPC provisions. Hence, state
reasons for each change will be analyzed and weighed against the
UPC rationale for the original provisions.
100-year-old statute invalidating certain bequests for charitable or religious purposes as
a denial of equal protection of law).
36. See SussMAN 62-120; Drury, The Uniform Probate Code and Illinois Probate
Practice, 6 LoYOLA U.L.J. 303 (1975); Johnson, The Abolition of Dower in Virginia: The
Uniform Probate Code As An Alternative To Proposed Legislation, 7 U. RicH. L. REv. 99
(1972).

.
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Section 2-102: Share of the Spouse

UPC section 2-102 gives the intestate's spouse all of the es
tate up to $50,000 and one-half of any balance, as against any
common issue or a parent. If, however, the intestate left issue by
a prior marriage, the spouse's interest is reduced as against the
issue to one-half of the entire estate. If no issue survives, the
spouse receives the first $50,000 and divides the excess with the
intestate's surviving parent or parents.
Six of the nine adopting states have altered this section sub
stantially.37 Two major alterations deserve attention: the omis
sion of parents from any determination of the spouse's share, and
the modification of the $50,000 threshold figure.
1.

Omission of parents from determination of the spouse's share

The Code decision to allow the decedent's surviving parents
to share in relatively large (over $50,000) intestate estates where
no issue of the decedent survives reflects several competing con
siderations. On one hand, there is a desire to leave a generous
share for the spouse since she likely would depend on the estate
for support. On the other hand, some persons who die relatively
early in life leave substantial estates derived in part from gifts or
other advantages bestowed by parents. Naturally, many of these
persons wish to return some of their wealth to their parents. By
providing the spouse with at least the first $50,000, the UPC
effectuates the decedent's likely intent to provide for her support.
Allowing the decedent's parents to share in the balance is a rea
sonable approach to satisfying the decedent's desire to return
excess wealth back to his family rather than eventually to his
spouse's family through her estate. If the intestate's parents do
not wish to receive the wealth, however, the Code facilitates their
renunciation, which could have the effect, without gift tax cost,
of leaving the spouse as the sole heir. 38
Arizona, Colorado, and Montana 39 have found the UPC pol
icy of providing a large share 40 of the intestate estate to the surviv
37. Those states are Arizona, Colorado, Montana, Nebraska, Utah, and South Da
kota.
38. See UPC § 2-801.
39. ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14-2102 (Spec. Pamphlet 1974); CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 15-11-102 (1973); MoNT. REv. CoDES ANN. § 91A-2-102 (Spec. Uniform Prob. Code
Pamphlet 1975).
40. R. WELLMAN, RESPONSE OF THE JOINT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM PRoBATE
ConE TO THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA's "THE UNIFORM PROBATE CoDE: ANALYSIS AND
CRITIQUE" 3 (1974).
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ing spouse to be paramount and have thus omitted the decedent's
parents from any determination of the surviving spouse's shareY
Without considering the goal of uniformity, the exclusion of
parents from this section by these three states is arguably a pro
gressive change. The Code's compromise approach presents ob
vious problems. It may be doubted whether the decedent would
favor his parents over his spouse, even to the extent of one-half
of the excess of his estate over $50,000-particularly where his
own energies were responsible for his wealth. It is also unlikely
that the average person would want to push his assets back a
generation, thereby inflating the estate of his parents upon its
later probate.
However, two responses in favor of uniform adoption of sec
tion 2-102 should be noted. First, most of the identified problems
will arise only rarely since net distributable estates exceeding
$50,000 in value usually are not intestate. 42 Second, it is simple
to adjust succession laws to the needs of larger estates by means
of a will or renunciations. The provision under discussion resulted
from a carefully considered compromise in the National Confer
ence, allowing parents some inheritance, first, in partial defer
ence to long tradition, and, second, in order to mesh inheritance
rights with the not unfamiliar pattern of children supporting par
ents in their declining years. The goal of giving more of the estate
to the spouse was the principal objective of the drafters and the
National Conference. This big step was made more palatable for
some Commissioners because it was surrounded by comfortingly
familiar features from present inheritance law. These same con
siderations should have local appeal. In any event, the position
of the national Code on the point was reached after careful evalu
ation of all arguments and, given the importance of achieving
uniformity, should prevail over alternative positions.
41. The UPC provided the surviving spouse a larger share of the intestate's estate in
order to reflect the desires of most married persons. UPC § 2-102, Comment; SusSMAN 289
90. Most lawyers would probably agree that in small to moderate estates, a deceased
spouse usually leaves his entire estate to the surviving spouse. The inheritance pattern of
the UPC reflects this empirical reality. Note that Montana has undermined this policy
by reducing the share of the surviving spouse to one-third where there are issue of the
decedent surviving who are not also issue of the spouse. MoNT. REv. CoDES ANN. § 91A
102(2)(a)(b) (Spec. Uniform Prob. Code Pamphlet 1975).
42. See SusSMAN 73-76; Drury, supra note 36, at 314-15; Johnson, supra note 36, at
113-14.
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Modification of the $50,000 threshold

Another variance in section 2-102 concerns the $50,000 share
for the spouse. The National Conference invited deviations from
this provision by bracketing the figure, thus signaling that the
amount was merely recommended for uniform enactment rather
than mandated. This concession to local judgment aided accept
ance of the major change-giving the spouse all of most modest
estates. It also reflected recognition by the National Conference
that a figure like $50,000 may have different significance in differ
ent parts of the country.
Five of the enacting states, Arizona, Colorado, Nebraska,
South Dakota, and Utah, changed the $50,000 threshold figure
suggested by the National Conference. 43 In cases where there is
no surviving issue, Utah and South Dakota give the surviving
spouse the first $100,000. The decedent's parents then become
entitled to one-half of the excess. 44 In cases where only common
issue of the decedent and the spouse survive, Utah adopts the
Code's $50,000 threshold; 45 South Dakota, however, continues to
use the $100,000 figure. 46 Nebraska allows the spouse $35,000 be
fore requiring her to divide the excess with the next takers,
whether they be issue or the decedent's parents. 47 Colorado's
threshold is $25,000, the excess to be shared only with issue (par
ents having been excluded by the statute as noted above). 48 The
emerging pattern of enacted figures tends to sustain the judgment
of the National Conference that $50,000 is about right.
Arizona, a community property state, gives the surviving
spouse the entire estate in both the decedent's separate property
and his share of the community, unless there are issue of the
decedent surviving who are not also issue of the surviving spouse.
In the latter event, the spouse receives one-half of the decedent's
separate property and none of the decedent's share of the com
43. UPC § 2-102; ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 14-2102 (Spec. Pamphlet 1974); Cow. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 15-11-102 (1973); NEB. REv. STAT. § 30-2302 (Cum. Supp. 1974); S.D. UNI
FORM PRoB. ConE§ 2-102 (1975); UTAH ConE ANN. § 75-2-102 (Spec. Supp. 1975).
44. S.D. UNIFORM PRoB. ConE § 2-102(2) (1975); UTAH ConE ANN. § 75-2-102(1)(b)
(Spec. Supp. 1975).
45. UTAH ConE ANN. § 75-2-102(1)(c) (Spec. Supp. 1975).
46. S.D. UNIFORM PRos. ConE § 2-102(3) (1975).
47. NEB. REv. STAT. § 30-2302(2)(3) (Cum. Supp. 1974).
48. Cow. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 15-11-102(I)(b) (1973). The elimination of parents from
succession in Colorado whenever there is a surviving spouse reduces the pecuniary share
versus fractional interest problem that is implicit in any monetary threshold, but leaves
the problem to be faced in cases of estates that are shared by the spouse and issue.
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munity .49 This variation on the Code eliminates all dollar-amount
step problems, but it may be difficult to accept in common law
states.

B.

Section 2-103: Share of Heirs
Other Than Surviving Spouse

Section 2-103 deals with inheritance of that portion of the
estate not passing to the spouse and, in an effort to eliminate
remote relatives as potential heirs, excludes persons who are not
descended from the decedent's grandparents. Utah, Colorado,
Montana, and Nebraska altered this section in a way that works
considerable damage to the Code objective of eliminating remote
heirs. 50 These four states have added language that perpetuates
inheritance by more remote relations and preserves the concomi
tant problem of the "laughing heir ." 51
The possibility of inheritance by remote relatives is attribut
able to English tradition where no escheat would occur as long as
some blood relative survived. The principle, possibly sensible in
its medieval, agricultural setting, does not serve well in
contemporary society. Today's families exhibit little of the cohe
siveness of the past, and remote relatives fit only awkwardly in
the circle of persons deemed to be preferred as successors by most
persons. It follows that the decedent is likely to have disinherited
the remote heir in favor of some preferred friend or charity. In
deed, studies show that persons with wealth and no close relatives
usually make wills that presumably accomplish this end. Thus,
under modem conditions, allowing a remote relative to inherit
results in a windfall.
An intestate scheme that allows remote relatives to inherit
49. ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14-2102 (Spec. Pamphlet 1974). This is one of the most
constructive changes made by any of the states. By giving the surviving spouse the entire
estate (absent issue of the decedent who are not also issue of the surviving spouse) UPC
§ 2-102 is simplified, the valuation problem is removed, the decedent's probable intent is
fulfilled, and the possibility of guardianship for minor. or dependent children of the dece
dent is avoided. The guardianship possibility should be rare in any case since it is unlikely
that an estate worth more than $50,000 would pass by intestacy.
50. Cow. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15-11-103 (Cum. Supp. 1975); MoNT. REv. CoDES ANN.
§ 91A-2-103 (Spec. Uniform Prob. Code Pamphlet 1975); NEB. REv. STAT.§ 30-2303 (Cum.
Supp. 1974); UTAH CoDE ANN.§ 75-2-103 (Spec. Supp. 1975). Montana's change is perhaps
the most verbally complicated in the Code. See MoNT. REv. CoDES ANN. § 91A-2-103(2)
(Spec. Uniform Prob. Code Pamphlet 1975).
51. For a full discussion of the "laughing heir" problem see ELY, PROPERTY AND CoN
TRACT IN THEIR RELATIONS TO THE DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH 421-22 (1914); Cavers, Change
in the American Family and the "Laughing Heir", 20 IowA L. REv. 203 (1935).
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produces undesirable results even when a person dies testate. If
the will is to be probated formally rather than informally, obscure
heirs in far away places must be located and given notice. This
expensive process is required merely to satisfy the court that a
due search for heirs has occurred. Furthermore, sending notice to
remote relatives invites will contests; 52 remote relatives may lack
restraint about challenging the decedent's will, whereas closer
relatives are likely to respect the decedent's dispositive plan.
Thus, a state's failure to follow the Code pattern on this point,
even when a person dies testate, is likely to produce windfalls,
expensive pedigree searches, attempts to locate and give notice
to remote heirs, will contests, and losses to charities to the extent
that remote heirs prevail in those contests.

C.

Section 2-106: Representation

Section 2-106 describes the Code system of representation by
descendants, which calls for a distribution that is a mixture of the
familiar patterns of per stirpes and per capita. 53 The section pro
vides for an initial division of the portion of an estate passing to
"issue" of the intestate, his parents, or his grandparents, at the
generation nearest to the ancestor where there is at least one
living taker. The estate is divided into as many shares as there
are, of this generation, living heirs and deceased relatives who left
issue. Living heirs receive full shares. Surviving issue take as
representatives of the deceased, dividing equally the decedent's
share; the representation process is repeated if a group of repre
sentatives includes living descendants and surviving issue of de
ceased descendants. The approach permits equal treatment of
descendants who are closest to the ancestor and preserves the
traditional pattern of representation where one or more, but not
all, of the nearest generation have died leaving issue. 54
All of the UPC states have followed the Code pattern with
the exception of Utah, which adhered to a pure per stirpes for
mula so that grandchildren of the decedent take the shares their
52. UPC § 3-302. Probating the will informally is attended by a risk of a will contest
that lasts for at least 3 years after death. Id. § 3-108.
53. See id. § 2-106, Comment.
54. See Waggoner, A Proposed Alternative to the Uniform Probate Code's System for
Intestate Distribution Among Descendants, 66 Nw. U.L. REv. 626 (1971). See generally
Wormser, Per Stirpes or Per Capita, 105 TRusTs & EsTATES 91, 92 (1966). For an excellent
discussion of some relevant aspects of inheritance by collaterals see Atkinson, Succession
Among Collaterals, 20 IowA L. REv. 185 (1935).
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parents would have taken even if all the decedent's children are
dead. 55

D.

Section 2-109: Meaning of Child and Related Terms

Section 2-109 sets out the meaning of "child" and related
terms in order to eliminate ancient discrimination against illegiti
mate children and to transplant adopted children entirely into a
relationship with the adoptive parents and their kin. Of the en
acting states, only Montana and Colorado altered this section of
the Code. 56
Montana adhered to its traditional policy of allowing
adopted children to inherit through natural parents57 by omitting
the Code language of section 2-109 (1) that denies this right.
Many, perhaps most, non-UPC states permit adopted children to
inherit from both their natural and adoptive families. The Code
theory, however, reflects more recent statutory patterns that per
mit adoption to accomplish its purpose of making the adopted
child solely and completely the child of his new parents. Vestigial
connections with natural relatives contradict this policy. 58 The
Montana position means, inter alia, that the adopted child is
entitled, along with other heirs, to receive notice when a will of a
close natural relative is formally probated. If the other survivors
have enough information to give such notice to adopted children,
55. UTAH ConE ANN. § 75-2-106 (Spec. Supp. 1975).
The original enactment in Colorado included a uniquely obscure formulation for
inheritance by descendants from ancestors more remote from the intestate than grandpar
ents. Its version of § 2-103 rejected the Code effort to avoid inheritance by very remote
relatives. CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15-11-103(e) (1973), until amended in 1975, provided:
If none of the relatives above enumerated [e.g., those related to the intestate
as his descendants or those of his parents or grandparents] be living, then to
the nearest lineal ancestors and their descendants, the descendants collectively
taking the share of their immediate ancestors, in equal parts.
In 1975, the language following "then to" was changed to read "the nearest lineal ancestor
and their issue, the issue taking equally if they are all of the same degree of kinship to
the decedent, but if of unequal degree, then those of more remote degree take by represen
tation." Although this formulation is not free of difficulty, it avoids the problems of the
original enactment. Unfortunately, however, the grotesque language of the original Colo
rado provision has been reborn in the New Mexico enactment. See N.M. STAT. ANN. §
32A-2-103E (Spec. Uniform Prob. Code Pamphlet 1975).
56. CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15-11-109 (1973); MoNT. REv. ConEs ANN. § 91A-2-109
(Spec. Uniform Prob. Code Pamphlet 1975).
57. See In re Kay's Estate, 127 Mont. 172, 180-81, 260 P.2d 391, 395 (1953).
58. For an interesting if, in parts, somewhat dated discussion of the status of adopted
children under the traditional laws of intestate succession see Kuhlmann, Intestate Suc
cession By and From the Adopted Child, 28 WASH. U.L.Q. 221 (1943); Fairley, Inheritance
Rights Consequent to Adoptions, 29 N.C.L. REv. 227 (1951).
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the resulting revelations may have painful and unpredictable ef
fects. Apart from emotional shock, the adopted child stands to
gain little from being associated with an estate of his natural
parents or kindred since it is probable that he will be disinherited
unless he successfully contests the will.
Colorado's change in section 2-109 anticipated an amend
ment made to the Code in 1975. When an illegitimate seeks to
establish paternity after the death of the alleged father, Colorado
requires merely that such paternity be established by a "prepon
derance of evidence. " 59 This standard of proof is substantially
lower than the pre-1975 UPC requirement of "clear and convinc
ing proof." 60 Arguably, this modification will increase the possi
bility of spurious suits and reduce the protection offered to the
acknowledged devisees of the decedent. The Colorado deviation
is understandable, however, in light of the concern expressed in
the late 60's and early 70's for the rights of illegitimates. 61 Both
the Colorado statute and the modification of UPC section 2-109
are in alignment with the National Conference's current
position, 62 which reflects increasing recognition of illegitimates'
rights.

E.

Section 2-112: Alienage

Section 2-112 rejects the ancient rule that an alien may not
inherit or transmit realty by descent. 63 In fundamental opposi
tion, Nebraska and Montana have modified the language of this
section to limit the right of aliens to receive realty by devise. 64
Nebraska places various restrictions on alien land ownership. 65
Montana, before permitting an alien to inherit realty, requires
59. CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15-11-109(i)(b)(II) (1973).
60. UPC § 2-109(2)(ii).
61. See H. KRAUSE, Iu.EGITIMACY: LAW AND SociAL PoLICY (1971); Krause, Bringing the
Bastard Into the Great Society-A Proposed Uniform Act on Legitimacy, 44 TEXAS L. REv.
829, 854-56 (1966). One product of the concern for illegitimates was the Uniform Parentage
Act, which recommended elimination of statutory discrimination that works to the disad
vantage of persons born out of wedlock. 1973 HANDBOOK OF THE NAT'L CoNFERENCE OF
CoMM'Rs ON UNIFORM STATE LAws 335.
62. AMENDMENTS TO THE UNIFORM PROBATE CODE [in 1975 NAT'L CONFERENCE OF
· CoMM'Rs oN UNIFORM STATE LAws 2].
63. See ATKINSON 53-54, 93-95. The disability never was applied to personalty in the
United States. UPC § 2-112, Comment; ATKINSON 93. Most states, before the UPC, had
removed this restriction as to land as well. ld.
64. NEB. REv. STAT. § 30-2312 (Cum. Supp. 1974); MoNT. REv. CoDES ANN. § 91A-2
111 (Spec. Uniform Prob. Code Pamphlet 1975).
65. NEB. ~EV. STAT. § 30-2312 (Cum. Supp. 1974); id. §§ 76-401 et seq. (1971).
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that the alien's homeland reciprocate in providing for land inheri
tance by aliens. 66
Although the point involves a matter of state policy that
overrides testamentary intention, there are two reasons why the
Code position regarding alienage is preferable to that taken by
Nebraska and Montana. First, the policy underlying the restric
tion of land ownership by aliens is no longer relevant. This dis
ability, which arose in medieval England, where land was bur
dened with feudal obligations and duties that were incompatible
with foreign ownership, 67 has ·since been abandoned in modern
Britain. 68
Second, the Nebraska-Montana provisions are arguably un
constitutional in light of Zschernig v. Miller. 69 In that case, the
United States Supreme Court struck down an Oregon statute
that provided for escheat when a nonresident alien heir failed to
show that his nation afforded Americans reciprocal inheritance
rights. The Court reasoned that the statute marked an unconsti
tutional intrusion by the state into tnatters involving United
States foreign policy, a realm reserved exclusively to the federal
government.

F.

Section 2-301: Omitted Spouse

Section 2-301 deals with the spouse who is omitted through
oversight from the decedent's will. Complementing the elective
share remedy described in section 2-201, et seq., the statutory
provision for a pretermitted spouse is available only in cases
where the decedent has not demonstrated that the omission was
deliberate. The Code allows use of statements from the dece
dent's will and evidence concerning non probate transfers to dem
onstrate an intention to omit the spouse from the will. 70 It reflects
the position that a fiat prohibition against the admission of ex
trinsic evidence is unnecessary and undesirable when weighed
against the policy of giving effect to the plan of a decedent who
may have had good reason to omit the spouse, including, pos
sibly, that ample provision had already been made for her.
Only Nebraska has substantially altered the language of sec
66. MoNT. REv. ConEs ANN.§ 91A-2-111 (Spec. Uniform Prob. Code Pamphlet 1975).
67. O'Connell & EfHand, Intestate Succession and Wills: A Comparative Analysis of
the Law of Arizona and the Uniform Probate Code, 14 ARIZ. L. REv. 205, 221 (1972).
68. British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act of 1914, 4 & 5 Geo. 5, c. 17, § 17.
69. 389 u.s. 429 (1968).
70. UPC § 2-301(a).
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tion 2-301. Its statute gives the omitted spouse a normal intestate
share regardless of the testator's intention, unless the spouse
waives this right by written statement. 71 The Nebraska provision,
less flexible than the more comprehensive Code language, admit
tedly achieves definiteness. But although the Code risks some
uncertainty, it is preferable to a rule that results in unintended
benefits for the spouse and unnecessary contradiction of the will.
The practical effect of the Nebraska version of the section, like
that of the old rule that marriage revokes a will, 72 is to force
testators to re-execute their wills after marriage without regard
for whether the marriage was anticipated in the will, or whether
ample provision from nonprobate assets was made for the pro
spective spouse. 73 It is submitted that this position is overly
mechanical, unnecessary, and likely to cause hardships for the
families of persons who remarry late in life.
G.

Section 2-302: Pretermitted Children

Section 2-302 basically protects pretermitted children by giv
ing them a share of the estate equal to what they would have
taken had the decedent died intestate. This section was designed
to improve on existing pretermission patterns that create signifi
cant advantages for a child born after execution of a will not
providing for then living children, and exclude consideration of
nonprobate gifts to the afterborn child. 74 Section 2-302 also per
mits relief in cases where a living child is omitted from a will
solely because testator mistakenly believes the child is dead.
Two adopting states, Nebraska and Utah, have modified the
language of this section. 75 In place of the language of section 2
71. NEB. REv. STAT. § 30~2320 (Cum-. Supp. 1974). See id. § 30-2320; UPC § 2-204.
72. Revocations of this type are provided for today in many jurisdictions. ATKINSON
424-27.
73. The Nebraska legislature apparently prefers the surviving spouse over pretermit
ted children. NEB. REv. STAT. § 30-2321 (Cum. Supp. 1974) provides that the share of a
pretermitted child is defeated when "it appears from the will that the omission was
intentional." This is part of the language that was dropped from § 30-2320 dealing with
the omitted spouse.
74. These advantages exist since pretermitted children who were born after execution
of the will are generally given statutory protection without examining the testator's possi
ble intentional omission-either because of a desire to disinherit the children or because
substantially all of the estate was devised to the other parent-or considering non probate
gifts to the afterborn child. In contrast, while UPC § 2-302 protects pretermitted children,
it also allows inquiry into whether the testator intentionally omitted the child and takes
into consideration nonprobate transfers by the decedent to the child with the intent that
they be in lieu of a testamentary transfer.
75. NEB. REv. STAT. § 30-2321 (Cum. Supp. 1974); UTAH CooE ANN.§ 75-2-302 (Spec.
Supp. 1975).
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302(3) that permits parole evidence to determine the testator's
intent to omit a child, Nebraska has substituted a mechanical
test by which any nonprobate transfer to an afterborn child "in
any amount equal to or greater than that child's share had the
testator died intestate" defeats that child's right to an intestate
share. 76 This change reflects the same suspicion toward the use
of parole evidence in testamentary matters that underlies N e
braska's changes in section 2-301; 77 hence, the testator's intention
under section 2-302 becomes irrelevant.
Besides ignoring the decedent's intention, the Nebraska pro
vision creates numerous additional problems and uncertainties.
For example, the provision fails to indicate whether the approxi
mation in value to an heir's share in intestacy is to be made at
the time of the inter vivos transfer or at death. In addition, it
seems anomalous for the afterborn child's rights to depend in part
on whether he has received nonprobate gifts when the pre-born
child's rights are determined without regard to nonprobate gifts.
Finally, the relationship of the provision to section 2-612, dealing
with ademption by satisfaction, is not clear. The Nebraska
draftsmen seem to have rejected consideration of the decedent's
intention in preference for a legal nightmare.
The Utah deviation, on the other hand, although it permits
use of extrinsic evidence to show that the omission of a child from
a will was intentional, includes "any of [the testator's] children"
as takers where omitted through oversight. 78 It does not limit the
protection to children "born or adopted after the execution of the
will," as does the Code. Utah's change ignores the entire context
of the pretermission problem and moves toward contradiction of
the premise that a testator's intention to disinherit his children
is legally effective. Pretermission is basically a "time gap" prob
lem, created because a will, although executed perhaps years
before the event, speaks only at the testator's death. Section 2
302 is designed, as is section 2-301, to support testamentary in
tention by mitigating the effects of unintentional disinheritance.
When a living child is omitted from a will, however, it is probable
that the omission was intentional. By forcing the testator to ex
plain what may be perfectly obvious when his words are read in
the context of surrounding circumstances, the Utah deviation
transforms section 2-301 into a provision that tends to prevent
76. NEB. REv. STAT. § 30-2321 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
77. See text accompanying note 71 supra.
78. UTAH CoDE ANN. § 75-2-302 (Spec. Supp. 1975).
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intentional disinheritance.
Even worse, Utah extends the protection of the section to
cases where the mention of issue of any deceased child is omitted
from a will. This extension increases the section's potential for
causing mischief, since testators may have many good reasons for
declining to provide for grandchildren by a deceased child. It is
odd and therefore legislatively unreasonable to expect that these
reasons will appear from the language of the will.
Utah's deviations from section 2-301 reflect prior Utah law,79
under which there was a rebuttable presumption that failure to
provide for children or a deceased child's issue was uninten
tional.80 Utah's prior rule, however, called for an examination of
the testator's intention respecting these omissions independently
of the presumption. 81 Unfortunately, under the new UPC lan
guage retained in the Utah enactment, proof of intentional omis
sion may be more limited than previously, since the UPC tests
were designed to placate lawyers who are squeamish about use of
extrinsic evidence regarding a decedent's intention.
H.

Section 2-401: Homestead Allowance

Many states exempt homestead land from the claims of un
secured creditors of either the husband or wife in order to provide
some assurance that the family home will not be lost in times of
economic distress. Also, upon a landowner's death, the typical
homestead exemption is available to his surviving spouse and
minor and dependent children. The statutes that create this ex
emption vary greatly in the amount, kind, and value of land
described. 82 To avoid the somewhat capricious results that can
occur under traditional provisions, since many modern families,
probably including the most necessitous, do not own land, the
UPC draftsmen substituted a suggested $5,000 allowance that
may be satisfied in kind for traditional homestead patterns. 83 In
keeping with its antecedents, this amount is exempted for the
benefit of a spouse or minor children of the decedent from unse
cured claims against the estate and takes precedence over the
terms of any will. Utah, Colorado, North Dakota, Montana, Ari
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

UTAH ConE ANN. § 74-1-32 (1953).
In re Atwood's Estate, 14 Utah 1, 45 P. 1036 (1896).
In re Newell's Estate, 78 Utah 463, 483-92, 5 P.2d 230, 237-41 (1931).
See ATKINSON 126-28.
UPC § 2-401.
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zona, and South Dakota did not accept section 2-401 as recom
mended.
Utah did not enact UPC section 2-401 at all. Instead, its
statute incorporates a limited exemption along traditionallines. 84
Coupled with a distressing Utah change regarding the family sup
port allowance, discussed later, 85 the exemption package in l_!tah
falls seriously short, in values and ease of payment, of the Code
recommendations. Inasmuch as the exemption package is of criti
cal importance in speeding the administration of small estates
involving a surviving spouse or dependent children, the devia
tions seriously jeopardize the chances that Utah citizens will de
rive any noticeable benefit from the new code.
Colorado's version of the Code simply omits any mention of
homestead or homestead allowance. 86 The North Dakota87 and
Montana 88 versions also reject the Code homestead concept in
favor of retaining the conventional landowner's homestead ex
emption. The Montana provision is singularly unsatisfactory
since it includes a new provision that purports to require every
personal representative of a married decedent, upon his appoint
ment, to file a homestead declaration for the decedent. 89 Thus,
the Montana statutory system appears to require the personal
representative to destroy the decedent's plan by claiming a home
stead exemption without regard to the amount of the decedent's
debts or the terms of the will. Some answer to this nonsense
surely will be worked out in practice if not by amendment.
In their respective versions of UPC section 2-401, Arizona 90
84. UTAH ConE ANN. § 75-2-401 (Spec. Supp. 1975) (providing the same homestead
allowance as § 28-1-1).
85. Note 106 and accompanying text infra.
86. Cow. REv. STAT. ANN. § 38-41-211 (1973) describes a homestead exemption of
$15,000 which is explicitly made available to a surviving spouse and minor children so long
as occupancy of the homestead continues. This exemption is in addition to exemptions
and allowances provided in the probate code.
87. N.D. CENT. ConE§ 30.1-07-01 {Spec. Uniform Prob. Code Supp. 1975) (refers to
N.D. CENT. ConE § 47-18-01 (1960) for definition of homestead).
88. MoNT. REv. ConEs ANN. § 91A-2-401 {Spec. Uniform Prob. Code Pamphlet 1975).
Montana's traditional homestead exemption is established and defined in MoNT. REv.
ConEs ANN. §§ 33-101 to -129 (1961). Section 33-129 would have been especially damaging
to the UPC goal of providing adequate funds for the surviving spouse since it provided
only for a life estate to the spouse with the remainder going to the children. Fortunately,
the legislature recognized this problem and repealed § 33-129 in An Act to Generally
Revise and Repeal Statutes on Wills, Succession, Probate and Guardianship to Conform
Montana Law to the Uniform Probate Code ch. 263, § 15, [1975] Mont. Laws 510.
89. MoNT. REv. ConEs ANN. § 91A-2-401(2) (Spec. Uniform Prob. Code Pamphlet
1975).
90. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2401 (Spec. Pamphlet 1974).
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and South Dakota91 narrowed the homestead exemption with re
gard to children. Under the Code, if there is no surviving spouse,
each minor and each dependent child is entitled to a share of the
homestead allowance. In Arizona and South Dakota, however,
the legislation omits the language relating to minority, leaving
the right to the exemption to be determined solely on the basis
of dependency. Somewhat more regrettably, both enactments
give expenses of administration precedence over the homestead
exemption. 92 Lawyers who normally will be engaged by benefici
aries of exemptions can protect themselves vis-a-vis fees; there is
no sound reason why attorneys' fees should receive priority over
family rights.
I.

Section 2-402: Exempt Property

Section 2-402 was drafted for the purpose, inter alia, of re
moving certain chattel property from the reach of creditors so
that family members may retain items of sentimental or personal
value that would bring little cash if sold to satisfy creditors'
claims. The surviving spouse and children (without regard to
dependency where no spouse survives) are entitled to an exemp
tion in such property, in addition to the homestead allowance, of
up to $3,500. The section also provides that if chattels of the
designated value are not available, cash or any other asset may
be exempted up to the maximum value of $3,500. This exemption
is justified by a combination of factors, including the good sense
of exempting small estates passing to close family survivors from
creditors' claims and the delays of administration. Also, to the
extent the provision serves to relieve fiduciaries of the necessity
to administer household goods, automobiles, and other assets
that are probably best left for disposal by family members, the
exempt chattel provision makes the estate plan provided by law
align with the pattern of well-drafted wills that include specific
gifts of household effects.
The UPC extension of the section 2-402 exemption to nonde
pendent adult children is vulnerable to attack if the state, as a
matter of policy, favors creditor protection over family conve
nience. Arizona balked at this point, changing the exemption so
that it is restricted to the spouse and dependent children. 93
91. S.D. UNIFORM PRoB. ConE § 2-401 (1975).
92. ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14-2401 (Spec. Pamphlet 1974); S.D. UNIFORM PROB.
ConE § 2-401 (1975). UPC § 2-401 exempts the homestead allowance from all claims
against the estate and gives the allowance priority over all claims.
93. ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14-2402 (Spec. Pamphlet 1974).
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Colorado has increased the amount of the exempt property
allowance to $7,500, converted it into a straight money allowance,
and restricted it to the spouse, children under 21, and dependent
children 94 of the decedent.
The Utah change in section 2-402 is unfortunate and unnec
essary. It provides that reasonable funeral expenses have priority
over the allowance provided by this section. 95 Perhaps the provi
sion is attributable to lobbyists; more probably, it is the result of
unconsidered and unfortunate attachment to former Utah law. 96
When probate was a formal, lengthy process, it was necessary to
allow payment of the burial expenses as a priority item so that
the funeral home would not have to wait through the slow probate
process before being paid. The UPC, however, facilitates prompt
payment of claims, particularly those like the funeral bill that
have priority over the decedent's unsecured general creditors.
The most obvious effect of a provision like Utah's that puts fu
neral expenses ahead of beneficiaries of family exemptions is to
delay and possibly jeopardize quick distribution of needed funds
to the surviving spouse.
The spouse would be at least as likely a source of quick
payment of the funeral bill as an estate fiduciary, who might feel
restricted by concern about his ability to prove the propriety of
every estate act. Since it is the spouse who normally will make
funeral arrangements, a clear understanding with the funeral
director that the bill will be paid as soon as the spouse receives
estate assets might better serve to facilitate prompt payment.
Once Utah funeral directors realize that under the UPC the pro
bate judge is no longer a sort of general supervisor of estates who
can aid them in bill collection proble!Ils, they may agree to new
legislation that would give family exemptions the full priority
intended by the UPC.

J.

Section 2-403: Family Allowance

Section 2-403 provides for the payment of a reasonable allow
ance for the maintenance of the decedent's immediate family
during administration of his estate. It is primarily the need for
immediate income by the family that justifies taking the amount
94. CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15-11-402 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
95. UTAH ConE ANN. § 75-2-402 (Spec. Supp. 1975).
96. ld. § 75-9-21 (1953); Columbia Trust Co. v. Anglum, 63 Utah 353, 225 P. 1089
(1924).
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of this allowance away from the creditors and the control of any
will.
After debate, the draftsmen determined that this allowance
should be made a terminable interest even though it would not
qualify for inclusion in the federal estate tax marital deduction
share of the,surviving spouse ..Their first concern was to make this
characteristic clear so that executors would not face unnecessary
complexities in applying marital deduction formula clauses. The
decision to place the allowance in the terminable interest cate
gory despite potential estate tax disadvantages was based on the
belief that state law exemptions should not be influenced by tax
considerations that will be relevant in relatively few estates. 97
To date, Nebraska, Arizona, and Utah have changed this
section. The Nebraska deviation from the Code attempts to make
this allowance, when payable to the surviving spouse, nontermin
able.98 Thus, it appears that either the considerations discussed
above were overlooked, or they were subordinated to a seldom
realized estate tax advantage. The small potential tax advantage
gained by the change certainly does not warrant deviation from
the carefully considered reasons behind making the allowance
terminable.
Arizona and Utah have each made a significant change in
section 2-403 consistent with their own changes made in preced
ing sections of Part 4. Arizona put administration expenses ahead
of the family allowance; 99 Utah put funeral expenses before this
allowance. 10° Criticisms of the same changes to related exemption
sections are equally valid with regard to the alterations in section
2-403. 101

K.

Section 2-404: Source, Determination,
and Documentation

Section 2-404 allows beneficiaries to select property for the
homestead allowance of section 2-401 and for the exemption
under section 4-402, subject to the restriction that specific devises
to others may not be disturbed except in cases of necessity. 102 If
97. This tax consideration affects only a small percentage of estates since only a small
percentage of estates are large enough to be concerned with the marital deduction.
98. NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2324 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
99. ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14-2403 (Spec. Pamphlet 1974).
100. UTAH ConE ANN. § 75-2-403 (Spec. Supp. 1975).
101. See text accompanying notes 93, 95 supra.
102. UPC § 2-404 is consistent with UPC § 3-906, establishing a preference for distri
bution in kind, and UPC §§ 3-709, 3-715(27), and 3-907, which provide guidelines for all
distributions.
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the beneficiaries of these exemptions fail to make their selections
within a reasonable time, the personal representative may do so
in behalf of the beneficiaries. The personal representative also
determines the amount of the family allowance within the bounds
set by the Code. 103 Review of the personal representative's deci
sion is available to any interested person who petitions the court.
Three states modified this section: South Dakota, Nebraska,
and Utah. 104 Curiously, South Dakota excludes nondependent
adult children from the rights outlined in the section, 105 thereby
causing a procedural rule to contradict the substantive rule in
that state's section 2-402, which gives adult children rights in
exempt property.
The Utah change in section 2-404 is one of the most damag
ing of any made to article IT. By inserting a requirement that the
personal representative pay the family allowance only "after no
tice to all interested parties and approval by the court," 106 Utah
has contradicted the Code's premise that probate matters should
be handled like other business and brought to court only when a
dispute arises among interested persons. Utah's deviation will
also frustrate a major policy of the UPC to permit small estates
to be distributed quickly and without undue risk to personal rep
resentatives. With respect to larger estates, the change frustrates
the UPC effort to allow a sizeable "nest egg" to be released rap
idly and easily to the surviving spouse.
The Utah revision is especially damaging since the added
delay and expense accomplish nothing. With or without the
change, creditors and other interested persons are protected by all
of the Code safeguards, including the provisions relating to per
sonal representatives, the limitation in amount of the allowances
themselves, and the provisions in section 2-404 that allow contest
of the selection, determination, or payment of the allowance by
the personal representative. 107
The Nebraska change provides that the personal representa
103. The personal representative may award up to $500 per month for up to 1 year
or up to $6,000 in a lump sum without court order. Upon petition by an aggrieved party,
the court has the power to increase the award.
104. NEB. REv. STAT. § 30-2325 (Cum. Supp. 1974); S.D. UNIFORM PRos. ConE § 2
404 (1975); UTAH ConE ANN. § 75-2-404 (Spec. Supp. 1975). Arizona made some changes
in this section to bring it into conformity with that state's community property approach,
but those are not significant enough to warrant discussion here.
105. See S.D. UNIFORM PRos. ConE § 2-404 (1975).
106. UTAH ConE ANN. § 75-2-404 (Spec. Supp. 1975).
107. See Kelley, Defensive Remedies Under the Uniform Probate Code, UPC NoTEs
No. 12 (June 1975).
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tive can be ordered to give "such notice as the court may require
in a proceeding initiated under . . . section 30-2405" before mak
ing selections of property to satisfy the allowance. 108 This lan
guage might be interpreted to require what amounts to a formal
proceeding as a precondition to distribution in kind of allowances,
even though the state legislature states that the "insertion of this
provision is not intended to imply that there should be a court
order except in unusual circumstances." 109 Still, if the section is·
construed in the way the Nebraska draftsmen suggest, it adds
nothing to the official text since section 2-404 already provides for
court review of the personal representative's discretion whenever
an interested person invokes the court's jurisdiction under section
3-105. The provision appears to have been inserted to invite the
use of formal proceedings in relation to allowances. As experience
with independent administration develops, it is hoped that the
invitation will be ignored.

L.

Section 2-502: Execution

Section 2-502 requires wills to meet minimal execution for
malities. A signature by or for the testator and the signatures of
two witnesses are required. The usual strict requirement that
witnesses sign the will in the testator's presence is eliminated.
Also eliminated are the requirements that the witnesses act to
gether and that they witness the testator's signature. It is enough
that the witnesses hear an acknowledgement by the testator of his
signature or his statement that the instrument is his will. Finally,
oral wills are omitted from the UPC.
The stated policy of the Code with regard to the execution
of wills is to reduce the formalities required for execution of a
witnessed will to a minimum. 110 This policy coordinates with oth
ers that are designed to make the will more popular. In a society
where mere signatures on checks and credit transactions can
transfer unlimited sums of money, where deeds of land may be
witnessed by persons who sign out of the presence of the grantor,
and where revocable trusts of personalty which control vast es
tates may be established without the aid of any witness, there is
no justification for a rule that invalidates a will witnessed by
persons who happen to sign out of the testator's presence.
108. NEB. REv. STAT. § 30-2325 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
109. ld. § 30-2325, Comment.
110. UPC § 2-502, Comment.
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Utah retains the requirement that witnesses sign the will in
the testator's presence and in the presence of each otherY 1 The
word "presence" has proved troublesome, 112 as is evident from the
large number of cases interpreting it. 113 The perpetuation of this
requirement, with all of its refinements as appended by the cases,
strikes directly at the policy behind the Code section. Certainly
enough formality is kept by the Code to solemnize the execution
of a will without maintaining esoteric rituals for their own sake.
Oral wills were omitted from the UPC since they are gener
ally disapproved. Courts have often declared their distaste for
such wills, 114 and commentators have attacked them as outdated,
of "inferior dignity," and subject to the usual problems of proof
where only oral evidence of a deceased person's intention is avail
able.ll5 The generally disfavored position of oral wills and the
simplicity of UPC formalities involved in the execution of a will,
including section 2-503, which permits holographic wills, militate
against a provision permitting oral wills.
Alaska has changed this provision to allow continued recog
nition of oral wills made by mariners and soldiers in the state. 116
Perhaps Alaska, as a frontier state, apprehends some special need
for oral wills. Even so, it would seem that those needing to use
oral wills would include more than merely mariners and soldiers.

M.

Section 2-503: Holographic Will

Section 2-503 provides for recognition of holographic wills.
South Dakota, Utah, and Nebraska all have added provisions
that affect the validity of such wills.
South Dakota's version of section 2-503 adds to the recom
mended Code provision the requirement that a holographic will
be dated to be valid, but then tacks on a section numbered 2
503A, which states that "failure to have dated a will does not
affect its validity . . . [!]" 117 It is difficult to know what to make
111. UTAH ConE ANN. § 75-2-502 (Spec. Supp. 1975).
112. For discussion of existing law and an indication of how ripe this area of the law
is for simplifying reform see Comment, Attestation of Wills-An Examination of Some
Problem Areas, 11 S. TEx. L.J. 125 (1969). For an example of how complex and variable
interpretation of traditional execution requirements has become see Annot., 75 A.L.R.2d
318 (1961) (dealing with the "presence" requirement only).
113. See, e.g., In re Thurman's Estate, 13 Utah 2d 156, 369 P.2d 925 (1962); In re
Alexander's Estate, 104 Utah 286, 139 P.2d 432 (1943).
114. ATKINSON 367.
115. Id.
116. ALASKA STAT. § 13.11.155 (1972).
117. S.D. UNIFORM PRos. ConE§§ 2-503, -503A (1974).
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of this legislation.
The Utah section adds a provision indicating that the ab
sence of a date on a holographic will invalidates the instrument
under certain circumstances, e.g., when there are several conflict
ing holographic wills and no "circumstances . . . that establish
which will was last executed. " 118 Although this is clearly better
than a rigid requirement that a holograph be dated, the provision
is superfluous. Nothing has been added to the general rule that a
will may be too indefinite to be given effect.
Utah adds an additional provision to section 2-503, requiring
that "the provisions" of the holographic will be in the testator's
handwriting, in contrast to the Code's requirement that only its
"material provisions" be in the testator's handwriting} 19 This
raises the spectre of possible invalidation of holographs that are
not "entirely" in the testator's hand, as in the case of holographs
on will forms, because one or more words on the paper are
printed. The draftsmen of the official text sought to support the
testator's intention whenever possible. The Utah committees evi
dently favored a rule that. tends to subject homemade wills to an
unreasonable, technical trap.
.
Nebraska presents the least justifiable alteration of this-sec
tion. Its statute simply adds dating to the other requisites for
validity of holographs. 120 Lack of a date on a will may cause prob
lems, but not necessarily; the date may be irrelevant, or other
evidence of the will's probable date may exist. In any event, there
is no reason to impose a different dating requirement on holo
graphic wills than other forms of wills. The change reflects the
bias of lawyers against homemade wills and departs from the
UPC policy of moving probate law closer to the desires of the
public.

N.

Section 2-505: Who May Witness

Section 2-505 provides that a beneficiary may be a witness
118. UTAH CoDE ANN. § 75-2-503 (Spec. Supp. 1975).
119. Compare UTAH CoDE ANN. § 75-2-503 (Spec. Supp. 1975) with UPC § 2-503. The
UPC language leaves the determination of what constitutes material provisions in each
case to the courts. The thrust of this section is to overrule those cases that have strictly
construed statutes which require the will to be entirely in the testator's handwriting. Such
constructions have resulted in the destruction of a testator's plan because of a typewritten
date, preamble, or other insubstantial departure from the statute. The handwritten char
acter of the material provisions and the signature combine to assure reliability against
fraud sufficiently to allow unimportant deviations in nonmaterial elements. See UPC §
2-503, Comment.
120. NEB. REv. STAT. § 30-2328 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
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without invalidating the will or disqualifying himself from taking
his full bequest. This is a departure from the ancient rule disqual
ifying "interested witnesses."
Disqualification of the interested witness dates from the time
of the passage of the Statute of Frauds in England. At that time,
no one interested in a lawsuit was competent to testify in it. 121 It
followed that anyone who had an interest under a will was incom
petent to testify concerning its execution ..With no competent
witnesses to prove its execution, the will failed. Although modern
law no longer disqualifies interested witnesses completely, most
state laws continue to discriminate against these witnesses in
some manner. Nearly all states now have rules that save the will
but expunge the witness of the taint of interest by voiding or
limiting his bequest. 122
The UPC position is based on a realization that the rule
disqualifying witnesses or forfeiting devises to them only penal
izes persons (including the testator, whose wishes are contra
dicted in part) who were ignorant, either that the testator in
cluded a provision for them, or of the rule that denies them their
legacy. Professional will draftsmen would not use beneficiaries of
the will as witnesses in any event, since the suggestion of undue
influence would invite contest. This means that in practice the
rule likely applies only to cases involving homemade wills and to
testators who turned to those closest to them, often persons who
would be expected to be named as beneficiaries, for assistance in
completing their wills. UPC draftsmen concluded that these typi
cal circumstances do not support what amounts to a conclusive
presumption of undue influence. Indeed, persons who unduly per
suade testators to make wills in their favor may be less likely than
innocent persons to want their names to appear as witnesses on
their handiwork. 123 The only meaningful protection against undue
influence is the ability to contest a will when the evidence war
rants. The UPC position is that this approach is more satisfactory
for cases involving devises to witnesses than one that predictably
draws legal lightning bolts down upon innocent and intended will
beneficiaries. 124
Nebraska, Utah, and Montana have substantially altered
121. ATKINSON 312.
122. See Annot., 95 A.L.R.2d 1256 (1964).
123. UPC § 2-505, Comment.
124. Many commentators have been critical of the "interested witness" rule. See,
e.g., Gulliver & Tilson, Classification of Gratuitous Transfers, 51 YALE L.J. 1, 11-13 (1941)
(excoriating the rule as a harsh measure to solve merely a "hypothetical" problem).
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this section. Nebraska allows an "interested witness" to receive
a bequest up to, but not exceeding, the share he would have
received had the testator died intestate. 125 If there is at least one
disinterested witness to the will, however, the witness-devisee
takes his full devise. Montana and Utah accepted the narrower
and more traditional pattern that limits the portion an interested
witness may take to the lesser of his testate or intestate share. 126
Although none of these deviations from the Code invalidate the
entire will (as did early English law), they are still substantially
out of step with the Code provisions. Since there is no good reason
for deviation on this point, the Nebraska, Utah, and Montana
versions of section 2-505 serve as a sad monument to the predilec
tion of lawyers, who serve as legislative draftsmen or critics of
proposed legislation, to adhere to old formulations of law that
lack modern justification.

0.

Section 2-507: Revocation by Writing or by Act

Section 2-507 gives familiar latitude to a testator to revoke
his will, in whole or in part, by express writing, implication, or
act. The breadth of this provision is consistent with the Code's
policy of giving effect to a decedent's intention whenever possible.
All but Colorado have accepted the UPC version of this section.
By restructuring section 2-507 so as to omit any mention of
partial revocation by act, Colorado effected a construction of the
section that will always work to defeat a testator's intention. 127
Admittedly, unexecuted markings on wills cause numerous prob
lems. But forbidding partial revocation by act has had little tend
ency to prevent or correct these problems. While testators who
leave ambiguous marks on their wills may be presumed to be ill
advised, it is not practical to try to prevent this ill-advised con
duct or just to deny all effect to revealed intent. Hence, the only
satisfactory position for the law is to effectuate the testator's
intention to the extent possible. Surely this is preferable to the
absurdity of denying effect to an attempted act of partial revoca
tion where the unrevoked portion of the will is readily ascertaina
125. NEB. REv. STAT. § 30-2330 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
126. MoNT. REv. ConEs ANN. § 91A-2-505 (Spec. Uniform Prob. Code Pamphlet
1975); UTAH ConE ANN. § 75-2-505 (Spec. Supp. 1975).
127. CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15-11-507(2) (1973). This change also raises some inter
esting practical questions. What will be the effect of interlineations in the testator's
handwriting? If initialed or signed, could they not be construed to be holographic codicils
revoking inconsistent sections of the prior will? What is a "signature" for purposes of UPC
§ 2-503?
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ble while conceding, in cases of successful partial obliteration,
that only what remains as intelligible may be given effect. Yet
this result has been reached under statutes similar to Colo
rado's.128

P.

Section 2-508: Revocation by Divorce; No Revocation by
Other Changes of Circumstances

Section 2-508 limits revocation by change of circumstance to
divorce, which revokes the portion of the will in favor of the
former spouse. Remarriage between the same persons revives the
will's provisions if revoked only by section 2-508.
Arizona 129 and Utah 130 added to the UPC by providing that
divorce not only revokes testamentary provisions in favor of the
ex-spouse, but also any in favor of the former spouse's issue who
are not also issue of the testator. Although this change has super
ficial appeal, many may quarrel with the implicit assump
tion-that divorce usually ends all contact and emotional ties
between the testator and issue of his ex-spouse-that justifies the
conclusion that a testator would not continue to intend to provide
for the ex-spouse's issue. In some circumstances, revocation of
gifts to a spouse's issue because of divorce undoubtedly reflects
intention, as in the case where a will provides for class gifts to the
spouse's "issue" or "children" without naming them. But consid
erable doubt would attend the revocation of gifts to a spouse's
issue when the devise is to an individual by name and does not
refer to the relationship between the devisee and the spouse. The
rule becomes positively untenable where the relationship between
the devisee and the testator antedates the marriage.
It seems doubtful that other states will want to follow this
deviation of Arizona and Utah, at least not without some qualify
ing language. Even with qualifiers, the notion of extending revo
cation by operation of law can be challenged as an unwise legisla
tive venture into the motives of testators concerning their reasons
for choosing the beneficiaries named in wills. After a testator dies,
guesswork about why he wrote the will that he left unrevoked at
death should be discouraged whenever possible. It is one thing to
legislate that devises to ex-spouses are revoked by divorce, for
there is no doubt that the relationship between the testator and
128. See, e.g., Henry v. Fraser, 58 App. D.C. 260, 29 F.2d 633 (D.C. Cir. 1928); In re
Johannes' Estate, 170 Kan. 407, 227 P.2d 148 (1951).
129. ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14-2508 (Spec. Pamphlet 1974).
130. UTAH ConE ANN. § 75-2-508 (Spec. Supp. 1975).
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the devisee has changed. It is quite another matter to extend the
assumption of changed relationship to persons who are not parties
to the divorce. There is, therefore, a sound reason for limiting
revocation by operation of law in divorce cases to the devise to
the former spouse.

Q.

Section 2-513: Separate Writing Identifying Bequest of
Tangible Property

Section 2-513 permits a testator to note in his will that he will
designate the beneficiaries of various personal assets on a list that
he has prepared or will prepare and leave to be found or identi
fied, as described in the will. Although frequently encountered in
practice, these lists were of doubtful validity under pre-Code
rules, and of utility only in cases where survivors were willing to
be guided by them. By validating these lists, the UPC provides
for the testator who may want to change his specific bequests
periodically, or who may wish to defer decision ab9ut chattel
dispositions until after the execution of his will. This concession
to testator's intent came into the Code because of the interests
of lawyers and clients in avoiding the necessity of preparing a
codicil whenever a client's whim changes concerning who should
inherit treasured items of personal property.
Nebraska changed section 2-513 to require that the outside
writing be dated. 131 This change is consistent with the unfortun
ate and unqualified requirement in that state that holographic
wills be dated. 132 The addition of a date requirement for a section
2-513 writing is even more dubious than the requirement of a date
for a holographic will. It is irrelevant to the application of section
2-513 whether the instrument referred to by the will was written
before or after the execution of the will. If there is no uncertainty,
such as in the case where only one document meets the descrip
tion in the will, the outside list should not be made inoperative
simply because that instrument happens to be undated.

R.

Section 2-605: Anti-lapse; Deceased Devisee; Class Gifts

Section 2-605 prevents the lapse of devises to certain devi
sees. Basically, if the testator makes a devise to a grandparent or
a lineal descendant of a grandparent, unless otherwise indicated,
the devise will not lapse by reason of the devisee's death if the
131. NEB. REv. STAT. § 30-2338 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
132. See text accompanying note 120 supra.
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devisee leaves issue who survive the testator.
Nebraska and Utah have both modified section 2-605 so that
it applies to devises to any relative, rather than only to relatives
who are descended from the testator's grandparents. 133 The
change is consistent with the acceptance in these codes of the
possibility of inheritance by very remote relatives. Still, it can be
questioned whether testators who make devises to remote rela
tives assume or intend that their gifts will pass to a deceased
devisee's issue. In addition, earlier criticism of inheritance by
remote relatives applies equally well here. 134

S.

Section 2-608: Nonademption of Specific Devises
in Certain Cases

Section 2-608 deals with three categories of ademption of
specific devises. The first category deals with dispositions of spe
cifically devised assets by a conservator. In these cases, if the
testator is not restored to competency at least 1 year before death,
the devisee is entitled to a general pecuniary devise in the amount
of the net proceeds of the conservator's sale. This devise is to be
made whether or not the proceeds of the disposition can be traced
into the testator's estate or whether the conservator has received
the sale proceeds. The second category deals narrowly with situa
tions in which a testator's title to a specifically devised asset has
been supplemented or replaced wholly or in part by the testator's
right (a) to unpaid proceeds from a sale of the asset; (b) to an
unpaid award in condemnation for a public taking of the asset;
(c) to unpaid proceeds from fire or other casualty insurance cover
ing a loss of the asset; or (d) to property owned as a result of
foreclosure of a security interest in the specifically devised asset.
In situations (a), (b), and (c), the devise is adeemed to the extent
that the testator has received payment but not otherwise; it is
irrelevant whether the proceeds remain in his· hands or can be
traced into other assets he owns at death. In situation (d), the
property received replaces the devise. The third and largest cate
gory embraces all other instances in which some or all of a specifi
cally devised asset is not owned by the testator at the time of his
death. Section 2-608, by failing to provide nonademption, implic
itly adopts the traditional view that such a devise is adeemed.
Both Montana and Colorado changed this section, but lim
133. NEB. REv. STAT.§ 30-2343 (Cum. Supp. 1974); UTAH CoDE ANN.§ 75-2-605 (Spec.
Supp. 1975).
134. See notes 51-52 and accompanying text supra.

388

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[1976:

ited their surgery to the portion dealing with sales by conserva
tors. Montana narrowed the protection against ademption to in
stances where the proceeds from the conservator's sale of the
devised asset are owned by the testator at death, or can be traced
into other assets then owned by him. 135 This variation follows a
line developed in pre-Code decisions 136 which the Code drafters
rejected in favor of a California precedent 137 that dispenses with
tracing and gives the devisee a pecuniary devise in substitution
for the specific devise of the thing sold. Tracing involves problems
of proof for estate administrators that should be avoided wherever
possible. The principal purpose of rules preventing ademption as
the result of conservators' sales is to minimize the possibility that
a testator's estate plan will be altered by his conservator. The rule
adopted by the UPC is calculated to minimize the effects of a
conservator's acts on a protected person's will without creating
troublesome problems of proof. 138
Colorado omits the language of section 2-608(a) that makes
the subsection inapplicable when a testator who has been under
a disability is adjudicated no longer disabled and survives the
adjudication by 1 year. 139 The effect of the omitted Code language
is to permit ademption when the testator is competent for the
prescribed period, the assumption being that he would make an
other provision for the devisee if he did not want the bequest
adeemed. The Code premise is questionable, however, and the
Colorado change seems desirable. About the only thing that can
safely be assumed about a conservator's sale is that it does not
necessarily involve the approval of the protected testator, and
may, therefore, contravene his intentions. It is arbitrary to make
any aspect of a testator's estate plan depend on whether he lived
more than a year after the conservatorship ends when it is uncer
tain, contrary to what the UPC drafters seem to have assumed,
that the testator within the year would have reviewed and
approved of the conservator's actions. The Code rightfully fol
lowed a significant amount of authority in its position that a
135. MoNT. REv. ConEs ANN. § 91A-2-608 (Spec. Uniform Prob. Code Pamphlet
1975).
136. See, e.g., Morse v. Converse, 80 N.H. 24, 113 A. 214 (1921).
137. In re Mason's Estate, 62 Cal. 2d 213, 397 P.2d 1005, 42 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1965).
138. It should be noted that a conservator under the Code is given standing to exam
ine the will of the person whose affairs he is managing, and is directed to disturb the estate
plan of the protected person as little as possible in carrying out his responsibilities as
conservator. UPC §§ 2-901, 5-427. If these provisions have their intended effect, problems
of ademption that arise because of conservators' sales should be rare.
139. Cow. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15-11-608 (1973).
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conservator's sale should not defeat the protected person's plan
to benefit certain persons by devises of the assets sold. There is
little to be said, however, for the Code's attempt to deal with
cases where the disabled person regains control of his estate. The
Colorado committees are therefore to be commended for changing
this provision.

T.

Miscellaneous

Several states made other significant changes that merit at
tention. Idaho, by addition to section 2-501, allows emancipated
minors, as well as persons over 18, to make a will. 140 This change
may represent an improvement on the Code which, at best, leaves
this point open and, at worst, will be read to exclude the possibil
ity. Curiously, Idaho complicated matters by allowing only adults
to make a self-proving will. 141
Colorado made three additional changes that are notewor
thy. First, Colorado requires that writings which are incorporated
by reference into a will be filed in court. 142 This alteration appar
ently follows the pre-Code law in Colorado that developed as
probate judges attempted to compel production of all documents
affecting a will's meaning for purposes of supervising estate ad
ministrations. This practice," however, cuts against the Code's
philosophy of reducing the court's role to that of settling disputes.
Second, section 15-11-511 of the Colorado Code, the testamentary
additions to trusts section, was changed to follow prior Colorado
law allowing a testator to make testamentary additions to trusts
created by the will of another person who dies within 6 months
after the testator's death. This change seems unnecessary, how
ever, since the Code's provision, section 2-512, permitting refer
ence to facts of nontestamentary significance, would seem to
cover the same point. Finally, Colorado's section 15-11-601 makes
a change in section 2-104 that purports to abrogate the UPC's
120-hour survivorship requirement when the state's simultaneous
death act applies. This is an ill-considered change that should be
ignored as meaningless. 143
140. IDAHO ConE § 15-2-501 (Supp. 1975).
141. Id. § 15-2-504.
142. CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15-11-510 (1973).
143. CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15-11-613 (1973) contains the simultaneous death provi
sions, but provides that the section will not apply in "any . . . situation where provision
is made for distribution of property different from the provisions of this section . . . ."
Perhaps, therefore, the Colorado addendum to UPC § 2-104, providing that § 15-11-601
is subject to the simultaneous death provisions of§ 15-11-613, will never apply.
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Montana changed section 2-607, dealing with gifts of specific
securities, to allow specific devisees of stock to receive additional
stock acquired by the testator through exercise of a purchase
option after execution of the will. 144 There is little reason to ex
pand the number of shares described by a devise just because the
testator bought more shares after executing the wilL Whether or
not the acquisition of the additional shares results from purchase
options arising from ownership of the devised stock, the testator
will have expended new funds in the purchase, and it is quite
uncertain whether he would want the new shares acquired to
follow the original stock gift.
Utah amended sections 2-110 and 2-612 on advancements
and ademption by satisfaction} 45 The requirement of both sec
tions that they be evidenced by a contemporaneous writing was
changed so that the execution of the writing need not coincide
with the completion of the gift. This alteration is unfortunate
because it obscures the focus of the section on the transferor's
intention at the time the gift is made. A later writing may be
evidence of a later intention, but not necessarily of that at the
time the gift was made. The drafters deliberately restricted con
sideration of intention under the statute to that at the time the
gift was made to avoid the inevitable errors that would result if
extrinsic- evidence of a testator's intentions any time after making
of the gift could be brought forward to prove whether the gift was
to be in lieu of a devise.
III.

CONCLUSION

In order to facilitate the comparison of the nine enacted ver
sions of article II reported here, the authors have prepared a chart
of symbols indicating acceptance or rejection of UPC recommen
dations for each of the 57 sections of article II. Arranged in col
umns representing the first enacting states, the chart shows 513
points of comparison between enactments of the Code to date and
the original recommendations of the National Conference con
cerning the substantive rules of inheritance.
Only 47 sections of article II were examined by this article. 146
144. MoNT. REv. CoDES ANN. § 91A-2-607 (Spec. Uniform Prob. Code Pamphlet
1975).
145. UTAH CoDE ANN. §§ 75-2-110, -612 (Spec. Supp. 1975).
146. These 47 sections do not include material in§§ 2-113, 2-201 to 2-207, 2-801, and
2-803, which deal with marital property rights, renunciation, and homicide by an heir. See
discussion of deleted material in note 1 supra.
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Of a possible 423 points of comparison, National Conference rec
ommendations were accepted in 354 instances and rejected in 69
others for an acceptance rate of 83.7%. Disregarding the compari
sons for sections 2-401 through 2-404, describing family probate
exemptions where local policy understandably may be more im
portant than concern for uniform rules supporting or reflecting
decedents' intentions, the total number of points of comparison
is reduced to 387, with 335 acceptances, for a rate of 86.6%.
In addition to this rather encouraging rate of acceptance of
uniform rules, advocates of simplicity in state inheritance laws
can take heart from the fact that virtually all of the legislated
deviations from the recommendations of article II fall into one of
two categories, neither of which should deter or detract from
ongoing efforts to win additional enactments of the Code. The
first category includes changes that obstruct, rather than regu
late, interpret, or presume, a decedent's intention as expressed in
his will. Since all states decline, except in a small percentage of
situations, to obstruct a testator's intentions, nonuniformity of
law regarding testamentary obstructions can be tolerated without
significant loss to the goals of modernizing and simplifying inheri
tance rules through uniformity.
The second category, including most of the changes that are
explored in detail in this article, consists of deviations from the
uniform law that are arbitrary and unsatisfactory when weighed
against the arguments for adhering to Code recommendations.
Legislators in states that have yet to enact the Code can be as
sured that, almost without exception, the changes made by the
enacting state do not improve on the Code. Except for a provision
in section 2-608 dealing with the effect of a conservator's sale of
a specifically devised asset, where the official text of the Code is
patently questionable, the decisions of the National Co11ference
and the language of the official text of the Code are preferable to
the local deviations.
Once it is accepted that all inheritance rules (save those
obstructing testamentary freedom) should be designed for the
convenience of testators rather than for the comfort and economic
well-being of probate courts and various echelons and degrees of
public and private probate specialists, uniformity of inheritance
rules becomes an obviously desirable goal in this country of many
states and mobile millions. When it is further perceived that the
Uniform Probate Code is a sound and tested set of recommenda
tions leading to this goal, the only remaining question for legisla
tors is simply whether the vote should be cast for or against the
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simplification that is obviously desired by most nonprofessionals.
Despite the fact that nonprofessionals vastly outnumber the pro
fessionals, however, the professionals have overwhelming advan
tages of expertise, interest, time for debate, and history on their
side. The principal hope for the public, therefore, is that the
Uniform Probate Code may gain enough visibility and momen
tum to carry the day.
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APPENDIX
Summary of Deviations From Article II by the First Nine Enactments
KEv.-S = substantially unchanged; 0 =.omitted; X = substantial change
UPC §
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